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Definition
The international legal definition of corruption
refers here to the one presented by Transparency
International: “The abuse of entrusted power for
private gain” (TI 2016).
The term “mahalla,” derived from the Arabic
mahali (“local”), is formally used in Uzbekistan to
mean neighborhood, local community, or state
administrative unit. Today, there are some
12,000 mahallas in Uzbekistan, each of which
consists of anything between 150 and 1,500
households. In Uzbekistan, local people also use
the word to describe community-based, informal
economic practices. In this sense, mahalla denotes
the means whereby people obtain access to public
goods, services, and social protection while
bypassing the state.
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the
emergence of 15 independent states, 5 of which
were in Central Asian. The Western world pro-
claimed the collapse as a victory for freedom and a
final triumph of democracy over communism.
There was a widespread assumption, both inside
and outside the post-Soviet space, that the intro-
duction of Western-style political institutions and
legal systems would promote good governance
and rule of law in post-Soviet societies. However,
an analysis of the academic literature and policy
reports on these societies indicates that social
inequality has apparently increased in the post-
Soviet period. This has resulted in a growing
concentration of wealth in the hands of klepto-
cratic state officials and business elites who are
well connected to the higher echelons of govern-
ment. It has also contributed to growing poverty
among the population in general (cf., Dillinger
2007; Habibov 2011; Hohmann et al. 2014;
Humphrey 2002; Luong 2004).
Corruption is one of the main problems in this
respect. There have been extensive discussions in
academic and policy circles of why corruption
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remains a persistent and pervasive phenomenon in
post-Soviet societies (e.g., Karklins 2002; Knack
2006; Polese 2008; Rivkin-Fish 2005; Urinboyev
and Svensson 2013; Wanner 2005; Werner 2000).
This chapter presents a further study in this
direction and focuses on the case of post-Soviet
Uzbekistan, about which, due to the authoritarian
nature of the political regime, only a limited
amount of information and data are available.
Uzbekistan is also an internationally significant
(yet under-researched) case given its position as
one of the most corrupt countries in the world
according to the Transparency International’s
(TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (TI 2016).
The purpose of this chapter is thus to explore
and delineate the factors and processes that
explain the emergence and ubiquity of corruption
in Uzbekistan, to analyze the current anti-
corruption situation and efforts in the country,
and then to suggest areas of governance reform
as well as avenues for future research.
Corruption and Informal Governance in
Uzbekistan: The Karimov Era
Uzbekistan, like other newly independent post-
Soviet states, was faced with the complex task
of building a new nation-state. Coming on the
heels of the global (Western) good governance
discourses, the political leadership of Uzbekistan
made all sorts of bold claims about their strong
commitment to the ideals of democracy, market
economy, human rights and the rule of law, as well
as their intention to dismantle the Soviet-style
governance (cf., Perlman and Gleason 2007). At
the same time, Uzbek authorities made it clear
that its governance system, while adhering to
global standards, would also deploy Uzbekistan’s
ancient traditions, rich Islamic heritage and
centuries-old administrative traditions in the
nation-building project (Karimov 1993). Many
international organizations, such as the World
Bank, IMF, and UNDP, promptly geared their
development programs to the Uzbek authorities’
reform agenda, financing and initiating innumer-
able good governance, market economy, and
human rights projects.
However, the complex and multidimensional
nature of the political stability challenges that
Uzbekistan faced in the 1990s, for different rea-
sons, made the government skeptical towards real
democratization and market reforms. The need to
prioritize political stability over reforms was jus-
tified by the unstable political situation in Central
Asia during the 1990s. This included ethnic
clashes between the Uzbeks and the Turks in
1989, ethnic conflicts between the Uzbek and
Kyrgyz people in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1990,
and the civil war in neighboring Tajikistan,
1992–1997 (Fane 1996; Megoran 2017; Warikoo
and Norbu 1992). Consequently, the Uzbek
authorities made it clear from the beginning that
the “big bang” or shock therapy approach to tran-
sition would not be suitable for Uzbekistan
(Ruziev et al. 2007). Instead, Uzbekistan adopted
a gradualist approach, maintaining Soviet-era
welfare policies and centralized control over the
priority sectors of the economy (Spoor 1995).
Thus, preserving the stability of the economy
and of the social and political order has since
become an overarching rationale for rejecting the
economic and political reforms recommended by
international institutions and for developing a
strict border regime (Fumagalli 2007).
Notably, during the early years of transition,
Uzbekistan achieved small but positive and per-
sistent economic growth due to its favorable eco-
nomic conditions such as the dominance of
agricultural production, the low level of initial
industrialization, and the rich natural resource
base (Zettelmeyer 1998). Uzbekistan suffered
less from the transition depression than its neigh-
boring Central Asian states and was among the
first to report positive output growth for the first
time in 1996 (Spechler 2002). The cumulative
decline in GDP between 1989 and 1996 was the
lowest in Uzbekistan among all former Soviet
republics. Uzbekistan did fairly well in terms of
providing a social safety net, alleviating poverty
and limiting spending cuts in education and health
care, especially in the mid-1990s (Johnson 2007;
Pomfret 2000). Soviet-style centralized economic
management and strong social protection mea-
sures seemed to be successful in the transition
period, as they prevented large output decline
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and served to maintain a reasonable standard of
living. The agricultural sector prevented the
increase of unemployment by providing job
opportunities in rural areas. In this respect,
during the early years of transition, Uzbekistan
maintained Soviet-era welfare policies and cen-
tralized control over the priority sectors of the
economy since these policies had considerably
contributed to political stability and security.
However, the gradual reform strategy appeared
to be a short-term remedy. The gradualist
approach to transition did indeed contribute to
the prevention of a sharp output loss and the
consequential rise in unemployment and social
unrest during the early years of transition. In
spite of this, by 2000, it became evident that the
economy was simply stagnating (Kandiyoti
2007). This was largely due to the government’s
heavy involvement in maintaining the practice of
centralized management over the key sectors of
the economy, which created significant adminis-
trative barriers and a high tax burden, thereby
causing high transaction costs for national busi-
ness and the prevalence of an informal economy
(Ergashev et al. 2006). As Kandiyoti (2007) main-
tains, the partial market reforms that the govern-
ment of Uzbekistan implemented in pursuit of
stability paradoxically resulted in inefficient
resource allocation and widespread corruption
that led to a significant retrenchment of the wel-
fare state. The centralized management methods
negatively affected the agricultural sector in
particular, which was evidenced by the govern-
ment actively intervening in the cotton sector by
redistributing income from agriculture. This was
done in order to develop industries that produced
import substitutes. Since agriculture has tradition-
ally been the main shock-absorbing structure in
rural areas, the reallocation of resources from
agriculture to industry negatively affected the liv-
ing standard of the rural population (Ilkhamov
2004; World Bank 1999). At the same time, the
government took a series of severe measures to
liquidate, or formalize, informal economic activi-
ties (bazaars and petty cross-border trade), which
provided alternative means of survival for hun-
dreds of thousands of people (Ilkhamov 2013).
Although the Uzbek economy is said to have
been experiencing above-trend rates of growth
(7–8%) since 2004 (IMF 2012), these indicators
hardly reflect the everyday realities in Uzbekistan
in which many people, especially in rural areas,
are compelled to secure their livelihood needs
through alternative sources of income and a social
safety net (Rasanayagam 2011; Urinboyev 2013).
These developments led to the emergence of
informal governance structures in Uzbekistan
(Urinboyev et al. 2018). As the state retreated
from its social welfare obligations and failed to
provide formal income-earning opportunities, cit-
izens reacted to these changes by devising infor-
mal coping strategies (Urinboyev and Svensson
2017). Many commentators now argue that
Uzbekistan has made little progress in promoting
the rule of law and good governance, and that
corruption has become a part and parcel of every-
day life (Ilkhamov 2017; Kandiyoti 2007; Lewis
2016; Markowitz 2008; Rasanayagam 2011;
Trevisani 2007; Urinboyev and Svensson 2013).
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index,
released annually by Transparency International,
Uzbekistan has regularly been ranked among the
most corrupt countries in the world (TI 2016).
The “control of corruption” indicator of the
World Bank Governance Studies also shows an
extremely high level of corruption in Uzbekistan
(World Bank 2014). Although Uzbekistan
acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption
in 2008 and recently adopted an Anti-Corruption
Law on January 4, 2017, no significant success in
reducing corruption has been apparent. The latest
policy report, Tackling Corruption in Uzbekistan,
commissioned by the Open Society Foundations
Eurasia Program shows that the Uzbek authori-
ties’ recent anticorruption drives largely reflect
political maneuverings in the elite, rather than a
genuine attempt to combat corruption (Lewis
2016).
Academically, there is a growing body of liter-
ature on Uzbekistan’s governance trajectories.
Much of the scholarly literature, especially
anthropological accounts, demonstrates that cor-
ruption permeates all levels of the state and soci-
ety, from daily interactions between ordinary
citizens and low-level state officials to klepto-
cratic practices involving high-level state officials
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(e.g., Abramson 2000; Ilkhamov 2017; Kandiyoti
2007; Markowitz 2008; Perlman and Gleason
2007; Rasanayagam 2011; Taksanov 2000;
Wegerich 2006). Much of this research concen-
trates on macrolevel topics and state-centered
approaches that focus on: authoritarianism and
the persistence of a Soviet-style administrative
culture, predatory elites, a dysfunctional public
administration system, illiberal economic poli-
cies, clan politics, post-Soviet agricultural
reforms, corrupt law-enforcement structures, and
inadequate ways of dealing with corruption on
the part of state authorities. These authors argue
that the struggles among various state actors to
gain control over scarce resources have resulted in
an inefficient resource allocation and contradic-
tory state policies, thereby making corruption
and bribery part of the governance mode in
Uzbekistan. At the same time, these studies also
claim that there is a need to distinguish between
the informal practices of kleptocratic elites, which
have nothing to do with “survival,” and the infor-
mal coping strategies of ordinary citizens and
low-level officials. Another body of scholarly
works suggests that it is the penetration of
clans and regional patronage networks into offi-
cial structures that depletes the state’s organiza-
tional powers and causes corruption in state
institutions (Collins 2003; Ilkhamov 2007;
Kubicek 1998; Luong 2004; Pashkun 2003).
Others have explained the ubiquity of corruption
in Uzbekistan as an outcome of its communist past
(Ergashev et al. 2006; Gleason 1995; Staples
1993).
The above studies share two common features
in terms of analyzing corruption in Uzbekistan.
First, they explain the ubiquity of corruption with
reference to the authoritarian nature of the politi-
cal regime. This idea is consistent with the main-
stream corruption literature in which a strong state
is seen as the key driver of widespread corruption,
especially when it tends to function as a totalitar-
ian and monopolizing agent (e.g., Heidenheimer
et al. 1989; Sun 2004; Varese 2001). Second, they
reflect the “corruption of the weak” approach, in
which informal or illegal practices are seen as a
survival strategy that provides alternative means
for ordinary residents and low-level state officials
to secure their basic needs (De Sardan 1999;
Ledeneva 2013; Polese 2008; Sneath 2002).
While recognizing the importance of “strong
state” explanations, it should be noted that they
are not sufficient, and run the risk of aggrandizing
the role of the state as being the prime mover of
widespread corruption, as if it alone shapes
the basic patterns of economic life and determines
the parameters of daily social relations. Moreover,
survival strategy explanations cannot satisfacto-
rily explain the nonmonetary and affective dimen-
sions of informal transactions. These needs to be
considered when studying corruption in tradi-
tional, collectivist societies like Uzbekistan
where society is organized around kinship net-
works. Of course, economic motivations play a
major role in informal transactions, but the fash-
ions and rituals in which they take place show a
high degree of embeddedness in social norms,
traditions, moral codes, and affective logics.
Hence, to gain a more nuanced understanding
of the nature, causes and forms of corruption in
Uzbekistan, there is also a need to focus on
the everyday life and social interactions on a
microlevel.
The Basic Social Fabric of Uzbek Society
Having been under the Soviet planning system for
more than 70 years, Uzbekistan embodies a pecu-
liar blend of traditionalism and modernity. As
Pashkun (2003) describes, the ruling elite is
quite Westernized (Russified), while a large por-
tion of society, especially the rural inhabitants
who account for more than 60% of the population,
are still strongly devoted to traditions, collectiv-
ism, family, kinship, and religious values
(Pashkun 2003; Poliakov 1992). This implies
that the behavioral imperatives, expectations,
and social sanctions emanating from these tradi-
tional structures largely shape the basic parame-
ters of everyday life and social relations in Uzbek
society (Urinboyev and Svensson 2017). These
processes become particularly evident when
observing the social interactions in the realm of
the mahalla (neighborhood community), a pri-
mary social institution that deserves special atten-
tion when examining corruption in Uzbekistan.
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As the state in contemporary Uzbekistan is no
longer able to provide jobs and social services,
Uzbek people frequently rely on social safety nets
and mutual aid practices within their mahalla and
kinship networks. These practices serve as a
shock-absorbing institution for many people,
enabling them to secure their basic needs and
gain access to public goods, services and social
protection unavailable from the state. Typically,
such mahalla-based mutual aid practices
include monetary and labor exchanges, rotating
savings and credit initiatives, noncompensated
labor during life-cycle rituals, housing construc-
tion and contributions to charity. Hence, few
wedding feasts, funerals, irrigation building,
road asphalting, medical operations or house con-
structions take place in the life of villagers without
family, kinship or mahalla support. For example,
according to Uzbek social norms, people are
expected to give a fixed amount of money to the
host when they attend wedding feasts. People
actively engage in such mutual aid activities,
since these practices enable them to not only
meet their livelihood needs but also provide
space for participation in everyday life and social
interactions.
These mutual aid practices create strong moral
and affective bonds within the realm of mahalla
life. Uzbek people regularly attend most of the
socializing events together and have a relationship
of mutual dependence. The fact that people meet
one another on a daily basis and regularly interact
at social events acts as a guarantee that mahalla
pressure and sanctions can be applied to an indi-
vidual or his family who are not acting fairly, or
are not helping a neighbor or mahalla member.
Consequently, there is a high probability that peo-
ple will help their family, kin, or mahalla members
when they need assistance. Relying on kinship
and mahalla connections is also a way to make
up for the “absent state”. Hence, the give-and-take
rituals constitute an integral part of everyday
interactions in Uzbek society.
While the aforementioned mutual aid practices
produce social solidarity and reinforce the basic
social fabric of Uzbek society, they may also
contribute to the emergence of the initial elements
of corruption. According to the informal mahalla
norms, the individual is expected to share his or
her economic resources and political influence
with the mahalla (family, kinship group, neigh-
bors). These norms shape the behavior of individ-
uals when they engage in public administration or
wield some political or economic resources. In
this regard, the state officials have little room for
individual choice and often find themselves torn
between loyalty to their family, kin, and mahalla
and honesty at work. Thus, upholding respect and
loyalty for family, kin, and mahalla networks
often comes at the expense of using/abusing
one’s public office, thereby leading to an omni-
presence of informal and illegal practices in state
institutions (cf. Urinboyev and Svensson 2013,
2017). In this way, mahalla-based social practices
undermine the rule of law and good governance
initiatives by promoting alternative versions of
how people should behave. Perlman and Gleason
also share this perspective, noting that the “Asian
path is different from other competing approaches
in that it is synthetic-binding together the interests
of the state, the society, the family, and the indi-
vidual” (2007, p. 1333). Hence, the behavioral
instructions promoted by the mahalla influence
social behavior and everyday life more effectively
than the laws of the state. Although these social
practices can be interpreted as an instance of “cor-
ruption” according to the international legal defi-
nitions thereof, they are accepted within mahalla
norms and traditions as a legitimate practice –
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.
Governance and Anticorruption Policies
in the Post-Karimov Period
The account presented in this entry mainly reflects
the state of everyday life under President Islam
Karimov (1991–2016) whose quarter-century
rule in Uzbekistan had left rampant corruption
and a stagnant economy that resulted in massive
labor migration to Russia and Kazakhstan
(Urinboyev 2017). It has been nearly 2 years
since Shavkat Mirziyoyev took over the leader-
ship of Uzbekistan. However, in contrast to early
predictions, Mirziyoyev emerged as a reform-
oriented, ambitious, and pragmatic leader
(Pannier 2017). Unlike the late president
(Karimov) who did not allow any forms of critical
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views, President Mirziyoyev openly acknowl-
edged the failure of public policies and showed
his readiness to make changes (Buckley 2018). He
is actively and publicly pursuing a number of
simultaneous reforms to change the everyday life
norm from “people should serve the government”
to “the government should serve the people.”
What is especially relevant with regard to anti-
corruption is that he began his reforms by asking
for input from citizens through online reception
systems, commonly known among ordinary peo-
ple as “portals” (e.g., https://my.gov.uz/oz). These
provide information about the government and
encourage citizens to report problems with service
provision and corruption and give feedback on
state policies. These online reception systems
enable ordinary citizens, even those living in
remote villages, to file complaints and request
assistance on various issues.
However, it remains to be seen if the anti-
corruption initiatives of the new Uzbek leadership
will produce any tangible results in the long run. In
spite of the recent positive changes, deeper sys-
temic and structural problems still remain
unaddressed by the new Uzbek government.
A recently published study indicates that
online reception systems have had a very limited
impact on the peripheries of Uzbekistan where
there are no viable forms of accountability or incen-
tive mechanisms that can make local government
officials act in accordance with the centrally
designed policies and laws (Urinboyev et al.
2018). It is highly likely that the Karimov-era
type informal governance practices will persist
unless measures adopted to promote good gover-
nance go beyond official proclamations and
rhetoric. Accountability schemes need positive
and negative incentives that are enforced from
above in order to bring about real positive changes
in everyday life. In the light of ongoing changes in
Uzbekistan, there is a need for further research that
investigates the state of corruption and the gover-
nance trajectories in the post-Karimov period.
Concluding Remarks
The chapter shows that the corruption in
Uzbekistan is not only the outcome of kleptocratic
practices and dysfunctional state institutions but is
also a reflection of the general informalization of
the state and society. Due to the inability of state to
provide adequate social protection, the general
population of Uzbekistan is compelled to turn to
an informal coping mechanism to “get things
done.” Both people and public officials are
increasingly reliant on the informal economic sys-
tem. From this perspective, the apparent resilience
of corruption in Uzbekistan, despite innumerable
anticorruption and good governance projects of
both Uzbek government and international actors,
resides in its embeddedness in informal forms
of coping strategies, and might be viewed as a
result of the “absent state” that fails to meet
the basic needs of its citizens. Any attempts at
eliminating informal livelihood strategies, with-
out creating alternatives, might destabilize and
create social discontent in an already troubled
and impoverished Uzbek society. Hence, anti-
corruption measures are not simply a matter of
getting people to obey the law. It is more impor-
tantly about promoting socioeconomic change.
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